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This paper assesses how organizational culture affects the fighting performance of
units  in  the  battlefield.  By  focusing  on  the  behavior  of  a  group  of  Argentine
troops  during  the  Falklands  War  in  1982.  Between  May  21  and  June  14,
Argentine and British troops engaged in a fierce land battle for the possession of a
group  of  islands  in  the  South  Atlantic  known  as  the  Falkland/Malvinas.  In  a
campaign  that  a  participant  characterized  as  “no  picnic,”  British  Marines,
paratroopers,  and  Guards  troops  defeated  the  Argentine  garrison  comprised
mainly  of  conscripted  soldiers.  However,  Argentine  Marine  units  especially
distinguished themselves for their fighting ability.  According to the author the
main reason for this performance rests on their organizational culture.
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“Argentines fought well and bravely in many parts of the islands. Not all. But
many. And it is those Argentine groups that are more interesting than those who
did run away” (Nora Kinzer Stewart)
1
“Vaux wrote how smartly marching Argentine Marines, holding their regimental
colors high, caught his eyes as they bravely marched along the muddy streets of
Port Stanley. When he learnt that these were their valiant foes from Tumbledown
Mountain, Vaux, his company commander, and sergeant major all had the idea
of snagging those Argentine regimental flag to decorate their Marine Commando
mess in England. To the Royal Marine’s chagrin, the Argentine Marines poured
gasoline  on  their  flags  and  burned  them  to  ashes  before  the  eyes  of  their
enemies. With the typical British grudging admiration for a brave enemy, Vaux
acknowledges that his brother Argentine Marines’ act of defiance was exactly
the same as the British Royal Marines would have done were they prisoners of
war.”
2
“The Marine Corps `spirit’ which I cannot explain (one feels it in his body only
and  acts  accordingly)  is  the  reason  why  our’s  is  the  greatest  fighting
organization  in  the  world”  (Second  Lieutenant  Richard  C.  Kennard,  USMC,
1944)
“Within the 5
th Marine battalion exists a special spirit that provides the troops
with a unique and inflexible will that pushes and obliges them to give their best
performance”
3
Between May 21 and June 14, 1982, Argentine and British troops engaged in a fierce land
battle  for  the  possession  of  a  group  of  islands  in  the  South  Atlantic  known  as  the
Falkland/Malvinas. In a campaign that a participant characterized as “no picnic,” British Marines,
paratroopers, and Guards troops defeated the Argentine garrison comprised mainly of conscripted
soldiers.
4 Among the Argentine troops, Marine units especially distinguished themselves for their
fighting  ability.    By  focusing  on  the  behavior  of  these  troops,  this  paper  assesses  how
organizational culture affects the fighting performance of units in the battlefield.
In general, observers have depicted the Falklands/Malvinas conflict as a one-sided show.
Despite these general assertions about the poor performance of the Argentine land forces, several
analysts present a more balanced judgment. According to these accounts, professionalism was a
distinctive characteristic of some Argentine units, particularly the Marines.3
What made the soldiers fight the way they did? The traditional and simple answer has
been “cohesion”. However, this paper provides the insights for another response.  In order to
understand  combat  performance,  observers  have  to  look  more  deeply  at  how  the  military
organizations instill the uniform values that allow their members to share the same spirit that
distinguishes  one  group  of  soldiers  from  another.  Consequently,  in  order  to  understand  the
performance of any military organization it is necessary to pay attention to the basic factors that
help to generate cohesion. These are the visible structural features of the organization, as well as
more subtle ones such as cultural features.
An  analysis  of  the  battle  waged  by  the  Marines  during  the  conflict  exposes  the
institutional  approach  adopted  by  the  Argentine  Navy,  in  order  to  confront  the  problems  of
organizing  and  leading  men  in  combat.
5  In  particular,  the  short  duration  of  the  conflict
underscores how important was their state of readiness and ability to sustain the first combat was.
The performance of the Marine battalion was the product not only of good training, but also of
the different organizational factors, structural and cultural, employed by the Argentine Navy.
These factors, in turn, improved cohesion.
In order to explicate the cultural attributes of the Argentine Marines, we used interviews
of  Navy  officers  on  active  duty  or  in  retirement  as  well  as  printed  official  and  semiofficial
articles,  documents,  and  testimonies.  Moreover,  the  Falklands/Malvinas  campaign  offers  an
opportunity for comparative historical research. In this case, during the same period of time,
against the same enemy, within a confined theater of operations, and with  the  same  type  of
conscripted  soldiers,  different  Argentine  military  units  showed  different  behavioral  patterns.
6
Only military service organizations were different.
Early  sections  of  the  paper  assess  the  Argentine  fighting  performance  during  the
campaign  and  that  of  the  Marines  in  particular.  Later  sections  take  up  the  concept  of4
organizational culture and its relations to fighting performance. On this basis it is possible to
examine  the  two  levels  of  organizational  factors,  the  structural  and  the  cultural.  The  paper
concludes with a comment on the effect of organizational factors by comparing the Argentine
Marines and the Argentine Army. The findings should shed some fresh light on the importance of
organizational culture per se in different military institutions.
Assessing the Argentine fighting performance
In general, scholars have depicted the Falklands/Malvinas War as a one-sided show.  For
instance, Cohen states that the British success in the 1982 war was predetermined because the
Argentine troops were poorly led and trained.
7  Others have attributed the Argentine defeat to the
lack of military cohesion.  In this case, the key to British success was their advantage in training,
stamina, and leadership, which produced a highly cohesive force.
8  In this same line of analysis,
some observers point to the poor motivation of the Argentine conscripts.
9 As a final example, a
privileged British participant in the action considers it is fair to describe the Argentine Army as
“military pygmies.”
10
Despite these general assertions about the poor performance of the Argentine land forces,
several accounts present a more balanced judgment. For example, Nora Stewart, an American
scholar who studied the combat cohesiveness of the two armies during the conflict, maintains that
“the Argentines fought well and bravely in many parts of the islands. Not all. But many.”
11
Stewart includes the Marines among the positive cases. Consequently, these are the cases that
deserve more analysis.
The Argentine Marines defended Mount Tumbledown against the attacks of the Scots
Guards during the night of June 13-14.  The site of the battle was part of the inner defensive ring
around Port Stanley, the capital of the Malvinas, and it has been described as part of  “those areas5
of the battlefield where British troops fought professional and well-trained Argentine groups . . .
English units like [the] Welsh and Scots Guards paid a high price [for capturing this position]”.
12
The fact that Mount Tumbledown “fell only after fierce fighting” underscores “the spottiness in
the quality of Argentine troop performance.”
13
The Argentine Marine forces in the Falklands/Malvinas Theater
After the Argentine occupation of the islands, the original plan for their defense did not
contemplate  further  use  of  Marine  forces.
14  When  the  political  situation  forced  the  High
Command to reinforce the garrison on the islands, however, the Marines were among troops
chosen  to  do  so.  The  total  Marine  contingent  sent  to  the  Malvinas  comprised  1,590  troops.
Another 3,587 Marines garrisoned the Island of Tierra del Fuego.
15  These last troops constituted
the 1
st Marine Brigade, which represented the strategic operational reserve for the South Atlantic
Theater of Operations.
16
The backbone of the Marine contingent was the 5
th Marine Battalion (BIM 5).  The Navy
High Command decided to send it because it was the best prepared to fight on the kind of terrain
on the islands and because it was well equipped and highly trained (specially on air cooperation
and night fighting), so that its personnel was best suited for this kind of operation.
17  Since 1952
the 5
th Marine Battalion had been stationed near the town of Río Grande, on the Island of Tierra
del Fuego, approximately 750 km away from the Malvinas. This was also the Marine training
school unit that specialized in cold areas, low mountain and “monte austral” combat.
18
On April 8th, the 5th Marine Battalion received orders to go to the Malvinas. Through
April 12th, Marine personnel and equipment were airlifted to Port Stanley. Once the unit was
totally  in  place,  the  operational  theater  command  ordered  its  members  to  prepare  defensive
positions  around  the  capital.  More  precisely,  the  5th  Marine  Battalion  was  assigned6
responsibilities  for  defending  Mount  Tumbledown,  Mount  William,  and  Sapper  Hill.
19  To
accomplish this task, the battalion had a total force of 703 men. All its conscripts were from the
class of 1962 or older, and no recently incorporated conscripts (class of 1963) were sent to the
islands.
20  The battalion was far from complete, since only the rifle companies, the headquarters
unit, and a few logistical units entered the islands.
21 Other Marine  units  soon  reinforced  the
battalion, however, including a group of heavy machine-guns with 29 men, the First Platoon of
Marine Amphibious Engineers (20 men), and B Battery of the Marine Field Artillery Battalion
(85 men).
22
The battalion was not the only Marine contingent rushed to the islands.  Other units sent
to garrison Port Stanley, Camber Peninsula, and Pebble Island included a Marine Antiaircraft
Battalion (308 men), the remaining part of the Amphibious Engineers Company, a detachment of
Amphibious Commandos (10 men), the Third Platoon D Company of 2nd Marine Battalion (39
men), Second and Third Platoons of H Company of 3rd Marine Battalion (65 men), two groups
of  anti-tank  missiles  Bantam  (24  men),  three  groups  of  forward  air  controllers  (12  men),  a
Security platoon (23 men and 18 dogs) and a Marine Command detachment (9 men).
23  All these
units also saw action in the defense of the islands with positive results.
24
During their deployment to the islands, the Marines were well fed, and they had good
clothing and improved communications equipment. During the period between their arrival and
the fighting, the Marines kept busy preparing their positions, digging bunkers, cleaning their
equipment,  reconnoitering  the  terrain,  and  coordinating  and  organizing  fire  support.
25  The
battalion was also well provided with entrenching tools.
26  These preparations soon became key
elements in the strong defense that the Marines put up against the attacking British troops.7
The battle for Mount Tumbledown: assessment and acknowledgment
The final combat around Port Stanley took place between June 11 and 14 on the Mounts
surrounding the town.
27   The 2
nd Scots Guards attacked Mount Tumbledown late in the night of
the 13th. As the Scots Guards began the attack against the main heights of Tumbledown, they
encountered fierce machine-gun fire.  A British war correspondent described the action in the
following terms:
Within  a  few  minutes,  Argentine  snipers  using  night  sights  had  killed  three
Guardsmen and wounded two more. The usual British formula of replying with 66
and 84 mm rocket fire seemed to have little impact on the enemy positions among
the rocks. The Scots Guards could hear some of the Argentineans shouting and
even  singing  as  they  fought.  These  were  the  best  troops  General  Menéndez
[Argentine military governor of the Islands] put into the field, the 5
th Marines…As
night  wore  on  and  the  fierce  firefight  continued,  they  showed  no  sign  of
crumbling, and their main positions held firm.
28
The action described by Hasting and Jenkins lasted for eleven hours:
The Guards reached the last of the enemy positions on Tumbledown only after a
further  struggle  inch  by  inch  up  the  rocks,  using  phosphorous  grenades  and
automatic weapons to force the enemy from his bunkers (…) The battalion had
(…) captured one of the most strongly defended Argentine positions of the war.
29
After a long night of fighting, the remaining Marines and some scattered Army units still
in possession of the battalion’s command post on Sapper Hill prepared to counterattack.
30  But at
about 12:30 pm on June 14
th, the Argentine High Command ordered them to cease fighting on the
islands. Argentine casualties only marginally outweighed the British.  At the end of the battle, the
5
th Marines had suffered a total of 61 casualties: 16 dead and 45 wounded.
31  The Scots Guards
reported nine of their number killed and 41 wounded.
32
On Mount Tumbledown, as the Sunday Times team explained to its readers, “the Scots
Guards were to face the toughest action of all.  There a well trained Argentinean marine battalion
was heavily dug into a series of intricate bunkers; cut in the rock . . . The firepower of the
marines  was  intense  and  impressive.”
33  Likewise,  the  American  military  analyst  Harry  G.8
Summers noted that:  “as [the British] approached the main heights of Mount Tumbledown, the
Scots Guards ran into heavy opposition. Instead of the hasty field fortifications that the British
had  faced  earlier  in  the  war,  they  came  up  against  a  strongly  entrenched  company  of  the
Argentine 5th Marines . . . A British artillery officer described these positions as `exceptionally
well-prepared'”
34
After  their  surrender,  the  Argentine  5th  Marines  “continued  to  behaved  cohesively,
unified,  and  showed  a  belligerent  manner…they  stayed  together  as  a  team”
35    According  to
Lieutenant-Colonel  N.  Vaux,  the  commanding  officer  of  the  42
nd  Marine  Commandos,  the
Argentine Marines marched smartly, holding their regimental colors high as they marched along
the streets of Port Stanley.
36  The British historian Martin Middlebrook also has words of praise:
The Argentine Marines considered themselves to be better troops than the army
units and they probably were. Their `rank and file' were still conscripts, but the
marine system of taking in new conscripts steadily throughout the year resulted in
the unit having a much higher level of training when dispatched to the Falklands,
and there were none of the younger 1963 Class recruits present. Other advantages
enjoyed  by  the  unit  were  its  better  cold-weather  clothing…and  it  was  also
supported by its own Marine Artillery Battery.
37
From the Argentine side, assessments produced outside the Navy were similarly positive.
A publication of the Army explicitly assessed the reasons for the superior performance of the 5th
Marine Battalion:
[They] possessed a well-balanced set of weapons, and excellent communication
equipment.    But  much  more  important,  because  of  the  Navy’s  particular  draft
system, they had enough trained soldiers adapted from peacetime to the terrain and
the extreme weather conditions . . . At the same time, the Navy’s excellent logistic
support system . . . could sustain the outstanding fighting performance.
38
The  official  account  of  the  Argentine  Commission  of  Inquiry  for  the  Malvinas  War,
known  as  Rattenbach  Report,  underscored  the  contrast  in  institutional  approaches  that  the
Argentine services demonstrated so clearly in the Falklands/Malvinas:9
Teamwork  spirit  and  higher  levels  of  training,  professionalism  and  adequate
equipment.  These aptitudes were shown in the land fighting during the defense of




Finally, a recent book written by the former commanding officer of Army’s 3
rd Artillery
Group, which was part of the forces defending Port Stanley, comments that “the British say that
at Tumbledown they confronted an elite Marine Battalion. I witnessed their professionalism.”
40
Friends and adversaries alike acknowledged the superior performance of the Argentine
Marine  units,  particularly  the  5
th  Battalion.
41    According  to  the  different  commentators  what
accounted for the distinctive performance was a balanced set of weapons and equipment, superior
logistics,  and  skill  in  the  preparation  of  defensive  positions.  The  Argentines  Marines  also
displayed a high degree of cohesion. Finally, analysts praised the Navy’s system of taking and
training conscripts and their resultant professionalism.
Organizational factors and fighting performance
The  concept  of  “fighting  performance”  used  in  this  paper  follows  that  of  Millet  and
Murray’s “tactical effectiveness” which refers “to specific techniques used by combat units to
fight engagements in order to secure operational objectives.”
42
Generally, to explain the fighting performance of military units scholars tend to focus on
a social psychological level of analysis, namely, cohesion. At moments, survival and victory
depend on the intense cooperation of all ranks during combat. Combat cohesion has been defined
as “a special bonding which implies that men are willing to die for the preservation of the group,
or the code of honor of the group, or the valor and honor of the country.”
43 Accordingly, analysts
conclude that the bonding between officers and men and among soldiers at all levels determines
whether or not a unit fights or runs away.
44  A high degree of cohesion is important because it
assures that “a military unit will attempt to perform its assigned or charged mission, irrespective10
of the situation.”
45
Besides  cohesion,  there  are  authors  who  move  up  to  a  societal  level  of  analysis  and
explain fighting performance as the outcome of the relations between the society and the armed
forces, citing in particular national character, religious beliefs, and/or ideology.
46
In between these two levels there is another level of analysis, the organizational. This
includes a set of variables related to the core characteristics of the organization in which the
soldiers  fight.  These  organizational  factors  are  also  important  at  the  moment  of  explaining
fighting performance. Organization is defined as “an entity with a define purpose, made up of
persons  or  members  and  a  systematic  structure.”
47  The  term  structure  describes  the  formal
framework or the communication and authority system of the organization.
48  Military historians,
however,  do  not  always  agree  on  the  component  parts  and  structure  of  an  organization.  For
instance, Peter Mansoor considers that organizational factors are only one of the three factors
vital to combat effectiveness.
49 This group of factors determines how the weapons are organized
and  employed.  They  include  doctrine,  command  and  control,  adaptability,  and  interservice
cooperation.
50  These last three, the style of command and control, adaptability, and interservice
cooperation, can stand as attributes of the organizational culture. In contrast, Robert Rush posits a
different  set  of  categories  and  contents.
51  According  to  Rush,  the  organizational  structure
includes  not  only  “the  formal  organization  of  the  combat  elements  and  the  administrative,
logistical, and other support elements that minister to the soldier’s primary needs” but also “the
intangibles of unit history and tradition.”
52 Consequently, Rush’s view also includes part of what
we will consider organizational culture within the overall organizational structure. Both Mansoor
and Rush do agree that an organization has, at least, a human component, a formal structure that
combines different elements and an organizational culture.
 This research also affirms that besides the human  component,  which  is  the  flesh,  an11
organization has a tangible organizational structure. This structure constitutes the skeleton, which
includes the formal organization and other tangible or visible elements such as weapons and
material,  number  of  members,  and  geographical  deployment  of  its  component  units  during
peacetime. There is, however, another dimension of the organization, the intangible elements of
the organizational culture. This dimension defines the personality of the organization; it shapes
the internal working of the organization; and it includes the basic assumptions, the set of norms,
values, beliefs, and formal knowledge of its members. These traits in turn influence the ways in
which soldiers behave collectively.
This paper assumes that in order to understand combat performance researchers have to
pay more attention to these structural and cultural aspects of the organization that help to mold
cohesion.  Consequently, the focus of this research moves from the “human dimension” to the
“organizational dimension” of warfare.
53
Organizational factors I: Organizational structure
The  appraisals  of  the  Argentine  Marines  in  combat  previously  cited  show  that  their
positive performance resulted from a balanced set of weapons and equipment, superior logistics,
and skill in the preparation of defensive positions. The Argentines Marines also displayed a high
degree  of  cohesion.  Finally,  analysts  also  praised  the  Navy’s  system  of  taking  and  training
conscripts. These are all easily observable attributes of the organizational structure. This research
adds another set of structural attributes to this list.
One such characteristic of the Argentine Marines is, as one of its members put it, the
“obsession for training and readiness that means we want to be prepared all the time.”
54  It is the
geographic  location  of  the  main  Marine  base,  Baterías,  which  helps  to  account  for  these
characteristics.  In effect, the geographic location of Baterías, which guards the entrance to the
naval base of Puerto Belgrano near the city of Bahía Blanca, explains in part this “drive” for12
training.  Its isolated location without civilian distractions provides the perfect Spartan incentives
to train more rigorously than any other unit placed near a city.
55
The garrison of Baterías also concentrates in one place the core of the Marine force,
namely, the Marine Brigade and the Amphibious Support Force.  The former “plans, regulates
and supervises the instruction, training and every operative activity of the formal component
units  of  this  battle  unit.”
56  During  the  Malvinas  campaign  the  Marine  Brigade  included  the
Headquarters  Battalion,  the  1
st  and  2
nd  Marine  Battalions,  1
st  Marine  Artillery  Battalion,  the
Support battalion, and the Amphibious Engineers Company. The mission of the  Amphibious
Support Force was “to provide the personnel, means and weapons systems, the support and/or
reinforcements to the operating units when required as ordered by the Marine Headquarters.”
57
This outfit comprised the Amphibious Vehicles Battalion 1, Communications Battalion 1, the
Antiaircraft Battalion, and the Amphibious Commandos Group.
Size  is  another  structural  factor  that  enhances  military  cohesion  (espiritu  de
cuerpo).  Writing  about  the  U.S.  Marine  Corps,  Cameron  judges  its  small  size  as  an
advantage, noting that “as the smallest and most homogeneous of the services, the Marine
Corps imposed its indoctrination on members more easily than the others.”
58 Similarly, in
the Argentine case, the Marines comprise a small force existing within the context of a
larger organization, the Navy. They find it easier get to know each other and learn to work
together.
59  In 1982, the total of Marine troops numbered 9,500 including officers, NCOs,
and  conscripts.  The  total  number  of  men  in  the  Navy  was  36,000,  including  18,000
conscripts.
60
In this case, structural factors such as isolated geographical location, concentration
of units, and small size could be viewed as acting in a way similar to what specialists on13
constitutional  studies  name  “enabling  constraints.”  Under  the  circumstances,  these
constraints did not weaken the organization; instead they helped to improve it.
61
Another advantage that the Navy has over the other services derives from having its own
means of logistic support means.
62  A veteran Marine officer has underscored that “the secret of
the successful logistic capacity of the Navy land units in Malvinas was that the logistics were
ours.  We did not depend on anybody else.”
63
Finally, according to some analysts, another important institutional feature distinguishing
the Argentine Marines from its sister services, and critical to its organizational performance, was
the system of inducting conscripts.  As an integral part of the Navy, Marines arranged to draft
new  recruits  bimonthly  in  five  successive  rotations,  a  procedure  which  guaranteed  enough
veteran conscripts during the full year.
64  The conscripts served a fixed time of 14 months.  This
system was adopted in the 1970s and “was one of the reasons the force was always ready to
fight.”
65  Conversely, as Stewart observed of the Army:
Conscripts are inducted in March; the training cycle closes in October; a portion
of the class is released in November, others in December and January, and the
final group after the induction of the new class in March.  Therefore, some
conscripts serve as few as eight months and others their full twelve-month
commitment.  Thus the lowest number of men in the Army is between January and
March (summer).
66
Under such circumstances, it was difficult in 1982 for the Army to be prepared to fight all year
round.
Structural factors such as geographical location, concentration of units, size, own logistic
support system and the draft system were distinctive attributes of the Argentine Navy and the
Marine  forces,  each  contributing  to  effective  training  and  integration.  The  presence  of  these
factors was important to accomplishing the mission expected from the soldiers in combat. The
next section will discuss the core cultural elements of the organization.14
Organizational factors II: organizational culture, military culture and fighting performance
In his historical review of the military organizations, Jeremy Black describes a pattern:
while weapons and tactics are easily reproduced if they are successful, it is much more difficult to
replicate “efficient military performance.”  According to Black, efficiency during combat seems
to be closely connected to the quality of the officers and NCOs.
67 Thus, how is it possible to
create high quality officers and NCOs?  A quick response to this question is to look at how the
military organizations recruit and prepare their personnel to do their job. During this process
organizations instill the essential values that allow their members to share the same spirit that
distinguish one group of soldiers from another.
68 Consequently, in order to understand the
performance of any organization, it is necessary to pay attention not only to the visible formal
structural features of the organization, but also to more subtle features. These are the cultural
elements characteristic of each organization. They are “socially constructed, unseen,” and are the
“unobservable force behind organizational activities.”
69
A common definition states that organizational culture is “the set of basic assumptions,
values, norms, beliefs, and formal knowledge that shape collective understandings.”
70
Organizational culture is stable, it acts as the social or normative glue that holds an organization
together, and it expresses the values or social ideals and beliefs that organization members come
to share.  It also enables the organization to cope with the external challenges.  According to
Scheina, these ideas are considered valid because they have worked well enough.
71  Most
important, culture provides generally accepted ways of accomplishing tasks; it provides “tool
kits” or a “repertoire” of organizational behavior.  It is important to note, however, that culture
does not define goals.
72  The relevance of the organizational culture resides in the fact that “the
organization continues to operate according to guidelines set by its culture and integrates
exogenous changes into its established way of doing things.”
7315
According to Kier, in military organizations, culture is transmitted to members through
the training process or “indoctrination”.  Military organizations as “total” organizations inculcate
a common culture or spirit.  That is an espirit de corps.
74  For example, when analyzing the case
of the U.S. Marine Corps, one historian observed that their “men shared an institutionally defined
relationship based on the subordination of the Marine spirit.”
75
While structural features are easily observable behaviors or procedures, cultural features
are harder to apprehend.
76  The analysis of the data suggests the following key elements of the
organizational culture of the Navy and, in particular, of the Marines.
77  While both the Navy and
the Marines share some of these elements, others belong specifically to the latter.
Integration
The educational system of the Navy is critical in stressing integration.
78  From the
beginning of the training of the young midshipman (cadete), he absorbs the idea of integration.
During the first two  years at the Naval Academy, instruction and training  are  given  without
separating  the  cadets  and  Marines  into  navy  and  midshipmen.  In  the  last  two  years  of  the
academy,  the  Marines  are  trained  as  infantry.  They  graduate  as  ensigns  (guardiamarinas)  in
charge of an infantry platoon.  After two years of serving in rifle companies, they begin their
specialization training in artillery, communications, engineering, or infantry in appropriate school
units.  It is important to note that, unlike the Army where the lines dividing the branches are
strictly established, Marines consider these specializations as mere professional orientations or as
technical skills. In the Army the separation of service branches was strictly established and the
cadets were trained from the beginning in separated classrooms and have separated dorms.
79
The members of the Marine unit become accustomed to working as a cohesive whole in
long campaigns. According to Captain Olmedo “the exercise of the whole brigade begins every16
October…It  is  a  system  operating  as  a  whole.    In  this  way,  the  Brigade  is  used  to  operate
altogether in long campaigns.”
80
This  activity  generates  integration,  a  situation  where  “everyone  knows  a  little  bit  of
everything and they train jointly.”
81  Consequently, during the Malvinas campaign the Marines
were very effective in the use of coordinated support fire.
82  Integration was also achieved not
only within the Marine force but also with other components of the Navy, namely, naval support
and especially aviation.
83  Overall, the Argentine Navy stresses the importance of unity of action
and “the concept of interoperability,” that is, the capability to operate in every geographical zone
in conjunction with the other component forces.
84 In contrast to the Navy, the Army has as a core
unit, the brigade, which stressed the concept of “great battle unit.”  Its main problem, however,
according to the interviewees, was its geographical dispersion, which made it very difficult to
train jointly.
Lastly, the naval profession teaches its members how important is to work harmoniously
as a well-oiled team. The personnel know that they will be confined within the small space of a
ship for a long time. Under such circumstances, the crew members stay in close contact with one
other and each individual is assigned an important task for the sake of the group as a whole.
Moreover, the axiom that “if the ship is sunk, in the rafts all the crew members will be equal” is
always present in their minds.
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Importance of Leadership
In his study about the U.S.  First Marine  Division’s  preparation  for  combat,  Cameron
observes  that  “Marines  almost  universally  credited  their  accomplishments  foremost  to
outstanding small-unit leadership.”
86  Argentine Marines are no exception to this observation.
Based on his combat experience in the Malvinas, Commander Alberto Baffico identifies as the17
key to the Marines' success the quality of leadership of Marine officers and NCOs.  According to
Baffico,  leadership  is  exerted  both  by  presence  and  by  example.
87    The  Argentine  Navy
emphasizes the leadership of personnel in practical as well as theoretical terms.  Contrary to what
some have said about some Argentine officers abandoning their men in the front line,
88 Baffico
affirms that Marines “were not alone in the positions.  There was a continuous presence of the
commanding officers (leaders).”  Furthermore, “in the Navy it is vital not to be an institutional
leader,  but  a  natural  one.”
89  Rear  Admiral  (Ret.)  Carlos  Büsser,  commanding  officer  of  the
Argentine landing forces in the Malvinas, credited Marines' superior performance to what he
described as the fact that:
Officers and NCOs were always near their troops. [Moreover,] they were in very
close contact to the different situations presented by modern combat; therefore,
they were able to solve them in a swift and safe way.
90
In sum, to lead is “to know how to give orders in such a way that they are carried out.”
91
Related to the role of leadership, some of the interviewees mentioned that Navy officers
are always taught to care for the well being of their subordinates.  Their “concern about the
personnel is real, not formal or merely declared.”
92  Also, for the Marines, “the man and his
personal weapon are the most important weapon system.”
93
Discipline
As in any military institution, the Argentine Navy and Marines also emphasize the value
of discipline. In this regard, two Marine officers, Vice Admiral (Ret.) Julio Bardi and Captain
Enrique Olmedo, concluded that the Argentine Marines are an especially highly disciplined force.
They stressed that within the force, discipline is both formal and fundamental. Marines tend to
emphasize formal discipline because they are more rigid and they “manifest the fundamental
discipline by abiding the formal principles.”
94 Within the Navy, Marines are best known for their
care in personal presentation and in military forms.
95  As an example, a Marine officer stationed18
in Puerto Belgrano observed that Navy's formal discipline was not as good as that of the Marines.
Thus, “Marines needed their formal discipline as a complement of their combat training.”
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The importance of Initiative
According to the interviewees, the Marines respect independent decision criteria.  That is,
they stress resourcefulness, self-reliance, and the capacity to take independent action. In this case,
“the  ability  to  act  by  self  initiative  is  more  remarkable  in  the  Marine  force.”
97  The  present
author's most memorable experience as a draftee in the Marine boot camp in 1978 was that the
NCOs always repeated during the drill: “the private always thinks and acts.” In contrast, his
friends drafted into the Army were drilled with the recurring phrase: “the private does not think;
he just obeys.”
The importance of Planning
According  to  Captain  Olmedo,  Marine  officers  are  educated  in  such  a  way  that  they
develop a characteristic planning capacity.  For this reason, they are usually assigned to lead
planning roles.
98  During the Malvinas War, the Marine High Command worked in the planning
of  the  invasion  of  the  islands.  Later,  it  planned  and  executed  the  mobilization  and  support
operations for the Marine troops on the islands and on the continent. Finally, it was ordered to
prepare numerous schematic plans.  These were very general plans with the purpose of solving a
very wide range of contingencies.
99  The demand for planning for every imaginable situation was
so great that the personnel came to use the unofficial acronym "PAPs", meaning “purposeless
plans.”
10019
The value of Tenacity
Tenacity is another value underscored by the interviewed officers.  According to Captain
(Ret.) Jorge Errecaborde, “tenacity is praised by the Marines.”  Moreover, Marines are different
not because they “are smarter but [they] are more tenacious.”  Marines are taught that they must
do what they say they are going to do.
101  In this case, states Captain Olmedo, “the idea of
achieving  a  mission  is  such  that  it  has  to  be  very  hard  to  find  out  a  justification  for  not
accomplishing the mission.”
102  In the Marines, training aims to teach recruits how “to overcome
obstacles by creating the means to do it.”
103  Another characteristic maxim for the men was: “to
overcome scarcities with ingenuity and sacrifice.”
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Foresight: The Logistic culture
One the often-cited advantage that the Argentine Marines exploited in the Malvinas was
their  “excellent  logistical  support.”    According  to  Rear  Admiral  (Ret.)  Büsser,  the  Navy
provisioned  the  Marines  stationed  in  the  islands  with  enough  supplies  of  food,  gasoline,
medicines, spare parts and clothing to last for 180 days. Naval commanders also sent sufficient
ammunition to sustain continuous fighting for 30 days.
105
The reasons for such foresight come from an important imperative in the Navy. The very
concept of “ship” means that, in order to operate successfully, a unit has to be self-sufficient.
106




  Regarding preparation, the Navy as an institution also demonstrated a capacity to learn
from past experiences. In effect, naval officers took advantage of the preparations for war against20
Chile  in  1978.  That  experience  allowed  the  Navy  to  adjust  its  equipment  and  to  obtain  the
necessary  supplies  to  sustain  a  campaign  in  areas  of  rigorous  weather  like  the  Malvinas.
108
Argentina and Chile had a long dispute for three small islands at the eastern entrance of the
Beagle Channel, at the south of Tierra del Fuego. When in 1977 an arbitration court awarded the
disputed islands to Chile, Argentina declared the ruling null. Bilateral negotiations followed but
broke down in the late 1978. Both countries mobilized and concentrated their armed forces in
their  respective  southern  areas.
109  Blackout  exercises  were  conducted  in  many  cities  of  both
countries.  According to Scheina:
On the Argentine side alone an army of about a quarter million men was stationed
along the frontier ready to defend the few mountain passes across the Andes. This
was probably the largest concentration of troops on the South American continent
since the Chaco War.
110
Both fleets concentrated on the southern waters ready to initiate the hostilities. The whole
Marine force along with other Army units was placed in charge of the defense of the island of
Tierra del Fuego. The Argentine 4
th Marine Battalion was scheduled to land on the disputed
islands.  On  December  22nd  Pope  John  Paul  II  intervened  in  the  dispute  and  announced  his
intention  to  mediate.  Consequently,  all  military  operations  ceased  and  the  condition  of  war
readiness was canceled.
111  From this experience the Argentine Navy “learned its need for greater
logistics capability.”
112  Later, in 1982, the logistical changes made after the mobilization of 1978
worked well.
Conclusion
After the Malvinas War, different analysts centered their explanations of the Marines'
distinguished performance on cohesion,  balance  of  weapons  and  equipment,  superior  logistic
support,  and  skill  in  the  preparation  of  defensive  positions.  Observers  also  praised  their
professionalism. In searching for a more comprehensive explanation, this paper also looks at21
other visible structural characteristics of the Marine organization, such as geographical location,
integration, the educational system, small size, the possession of its own logistical support, and
the nature of draft. Most importantly, the paper also considers a dimension rarely discussed-a
more subtle and unobservable one that helps to shape the spirit of the organization, its culture. In
the  case  of  the  Argentine  Marine  Corps,  leadership,  discipline,  initiative,  planning,  tenacity,
foresight, and the capacity to learn have worked well, and they may be considered valid elements
of Marine culture. The members of the Argentine Navy shared these basic values and beliefs, and
they proved to be critical for their performance during the campaign.
A preliminary comparative analysis of the land fighting in the Falklands/Malvinas also
exposed the institutional differences between the Army and the Navy in solving the problem of
organizing and leading men in combat.  In contrast to the Navy, the Army experienced some of
the difficulties that could be attributed to an organization of larger size, with a wide geographical
dispersion, a sharp distinction among branches (armas), and an annual system of conscription.
These  characteristics  handicapped  the  Army's  capacity  for  joint  training  and  hindered  its
cohesion. Army officer veterans of the campaign summarized the problem in the following terms,
Army  troops  lacked  combat  experience  in  classic  warfare,  and  convenient
integration and practice on joint work. These qualities were needed in the planning
and execution of the operations.
113
These shortcomings were exacerbated by the lack of a campaign contingency plan in case
of  a  full-scale  confrontation  with  the  British.  Under  the  circumstances,  the  Argentine  High
Command rushed the troops in without much planning and preparation.
114 Particularly, Army
troops performed poorly when they were sent to the islands without their heavy equipment and
support  equipment.  Most  of  them  lacked  sufficient  field  kitchens,  winter  clothing,  guns,
ammunition, communication equipment, or even spare batteries properly to support the troops.
115
As some claimed the consequences were that in some units, the soldiers suffered from a “critical22
lack of leadership” from their officers on the battlefield.
116  Notably, the most effective Argentine
Army efforts during the campaign came from the fractions or small units. As other research
suggests, when they fought well it was, mainly, because to the individual efforts of junior officers
and NCOs rather than the Army’s organizational backup.
The short duration of the conflict also underscores the central importance of readiness and
the ability to sustain the first combat. All the difficulties seem to point to serious organizational
problems spawned by an inadequate organizational culture. In the case of the Marine battalion,
however, its performance was the product not only of good training, but also of the different
organizational approach to the means of waging war that the Argentine Navy employed.
 It could be said that the cultural features here identified are common to all the military
services. Nonetheless, the Argentine Marines exhibited them conspicuously when tested under
real battlefield conditions. Strikingly, during the World War II in the Pacific, a  young U. S.
Marine reached the same conclusion. Even when the troops deployed into the Pacific were “all
American boys of the same breeding in general,” between the Army and the Marine Corps there
was, as he said, “a difference in training and spirit.”
117
This research also shows that, as the men joined the force, Marines were very successful
in inculcating a “Marine pride” that seems to be a nearly universal feature of Marine forces.
118
According to one Argentine Marine officer, “the Marines are the best troop that existed in the
history of our country -to these days, ever.”
119  These words echoed those written years before by
an American Marine: “the Marine Corps `spirit' which I cannot explain (one feels it in his body
and acts accordingly) is the reason why ours is the greatest fighting organization in the world.”
120
Finally, an official publication of the Argentine Navy published few years before the 1982
war characterized the 5
th Marine Battalion as a particularly cohesive unit. The reasons it gave for
this condition were isolation, geographical insularity, and the prevalent adverse conditions in the23
area. But most importantly, it pointed to the presence of a special spirit that provided the troops
with a “unique and inflexible will” that pushed them to the extremes.
121 This paper is an attempt
to find an explanation for that spirit.24
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